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Imagine you are walking down the street, wearing a backpack, 
and a police officer stops you and searches your bag.1 Even though 
you are carrying the backpack and its contents are concealed from 
outside view, you may still be required to prove that you expected the 
backpack to remain free from government intrusion.2 Should this 
expectation be implied? Under current Fourth Amendment standing 
doctrine, it is not.3 And if the backpack belongs to somebody else, you 
may have to claim an interest in its contents—even if they are illicit— 
to challenge an unlawful search.4 These requirements create a risky 
choice for defendants: either admit to knowledge of the illicit contents 
or lose the ability to challenge an unlawful search.5 
However, claiming a subjective expectation that property will 
remain free from governmental intrusion is no simple task. A party 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science and International Studies, June 2006, 
Northwestern University. 
1 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2010). 
2 See id. at 756. 
3 See id. at 758. 
4 Id.  
5 See id. at 756–57. 
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seeking to challenge a search is responsible for proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she held a subjective 
expectation of privacy.6 Moreover, a simple assertion that one 
expected privacy may not be enough to establish a subjective 
expectation of privacy.7 But, a privacy interest can be disclaimed with 
a simple statement.8 In evaluating whether a person has demonstrated 
a subjective expectation of privacy, courts usually find themselves in 
the position of evaluating whether the person has met his or her 
evidentiary burden and produced enough evidence to demonstrate that 
he or she believed an area would be private.9 
This Article explores the law surrounding Fourth Amendment 
standing. Part I examines the constitutional framework of Fourth 
Amendment law. Part II describes the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
decision in United States v. Carlisle, where the court held that a 
defendant carrying a backpack could not challenge its search because 
he failed to establish a subjective expectation of privacy.10 Part III 
contends that the court’s use of a five-factor test to determine whether 
the defendant held a reasonable expectation of privacy clouds the 
proper constitutional inquiry, especially when a defendant provides 
testimony at a suppression hearing. Rather, the court should use the 
                                                 
6 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). 
7 See United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 2008 WL 4724282, at *5–6 
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that a defendant failed to prove subjective 
expectation of privacy when the only testimony he personally provided was an 
assertion in his memorandum that he “believed he had an expectation of privacy”); 
United States v. Best, 255 F.Supp.2d 905, 911 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2003) (holding 
that a defendant failed to prove a subjective expectation of privacy when he 
submitted an affidavit saying he expected a residence would remain private). 
8 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (holding that a 
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy when he testified that he did not 
believe the area searched would remain free from governmental intrusion); Carlisle 
I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 2008) (stating that 
there are no “magic words” for disclaiming a privacy interest but that a defendant 
can make an implicit disavowal by denying knowledge of the illicit items discovered 
in a search). 
9 See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105–06. 
10 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759–60. 
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two-prong reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis set  out by the 
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.11 Part IV explains that despite 
using the wrong test, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless arrived at the 
legally correct result. In light of the current state of the law, this 
Article concludes with a policy discussion and a suggestion that the 
law surrounding Fourth Amendment standing should be revisited. 
 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
A. Reasonableness: An Exercise in Balancing 
 
 The starting point for any search analysis is the first clause of the 
Fourth Amendment, which states that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”12 This 
language provides the basis for the Supreme Court’s ubiquitous 
statement that reasonableness is the touchstone of any Fourth 
Amendment analysis.13 To determine whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances.14 
Because this is a highly fact-specific inquiry, the factors a court 
considers will vary from case-to-case.15 For instance, when police 
officers conduct a warrantless search, it may be relevant whether the 
individual has consented to a search.16 But if officers have obtained a 
valid warrant, consent is largely irrelevant and courts will instead look 
                                                 
11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
13 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
14 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). 
15 United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (“[W]e have treated 
reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely 
to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given 
case.”).  
16 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (“[A] search 
of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been 
authorized by a valid search warrant.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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to whether the warrant was executed reasonably.17 Ultimately, courts 
consider whether the intrusion upon an individual’s liberty was 
reasonable, in light of all the facts surrounding an event.18 
Balancing is central to this inquiry. On a factual level, the relevant 
factors in a given case are balanced against each other.19 Certain facts 
would suggest that government agents acted unreasonably, while 
others cut against that conclusion. For example, the fact that police 
officers requested consent to search a bag is a factor suggesting they 
behaved reasonably.20 However, if that consent was obtained while a 
dozen officers surrounded an unarmed defendant with their guns 
drawn, those factors would suggest that the officer behaved 
unreasonably.21 These facts would not be the end of the inquiry; a 
court would examine all factors with any bearing on whether the 
officers behaved reasonably in evaluating their conduct.22 By doing 
so, courts are striving to get a complete picture of an incident, so they 
can evaluate officer conduct within the appropriate contex 23t.  
                                                
Along with balancing specific facts, the reasonableness inquiry 
also embodies balancing  policy interests.24 These interests include 
 
17 Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A valid warrant is 
an independent basis for arrest, making consent irrelevant.”). 
18 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (Powell J., concurring) (“The 
ultimate question, therefore, is whether one’s claim to privacy from government 
intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.”) 
19 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (using a totality-of-the-
circumstances balancing test to evaluate a seizure). 
20 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446. U.S. 544, 551 (1980) (recognizing 
that consent makes a warrantless search reasonable, in that the search does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
21 See id. at 554 (suggesting that a person would be unreasonably seized, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when faced with “the threatening presence of 
several officers” or when an officer displayed a weapon). 
22 Courts look to all the circumstances surrounding an event to determine if 
officers behaved in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. See id. 
23 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152. 
24 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (stating that a court 
“must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
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due regard for both the individual’s liberty interest and the 
government’s interest in prosecuting crime.25 The reasonableness 
inquiry walks the line between these competing goals by striving to
strike a balance. This tension extends to the very core of the Fourth 
Amendment, as courts routinely disagree about its primary purpose
Some courts have stated that the Fourth Amendment was primarily




officers.   
                                                                                                                  
27 while others argue that its main 
objective is to constrain the conduct of police 28
While this may seem like an inconsequential dispute, our 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s purpose plays a key role in 
how searches and seizures are analyzed.29 For instance, if that purpose 
is limiting governmental action, it follows that searches and seizures 
should be analyzed by looking at facts known to a governmental actor 
at the time of the event.30 However, if we believe that the Fourth 
Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect individual liberty, then it 
may be preferable to consider any facts that shed light on whether 
 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion” in discussing whether a seizure was reasonable). 
25 See United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the Fourth 
Amendment is intended to strike a balance between the interest of the individual in 
being left alone by the police and the interest of the community in being free from 
the menace of crime”); see also United States v. Fernandez-Guzman, 577 F.2d 1093, 
1097 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that the seizure inquiry seeks to strike a “proper balance 
between the often conflicting interests of government control of crime and individual 
privacy”). 
26 Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), with Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599–600 (1975). 
27 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as 
recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”). 
28 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 599–600 (recognizing that the exclusionary rule’s 
deterrent effect on “lawless conduct by federal officers” protects a Fourth 
Amendment guarantee). 
29 See infra Part IV. 
30 See United States v. Grogg, 534 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In 
evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop, we examine the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop.”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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individual liberty has been infringed, even if those facts were not 
known to officers at the time of the search or seizure (and thus, did not 
influence the officers’ conduct).31 This understanding may justify a 
finding that no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, even in 
cases where officer conduct was unlawful.32 This scenario forms the 
basis of so-called Fourth Amendment standing issues, which are the 
focus of this Article. 
 
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis 
 
In most cases, the Fourth Amendment analysis occurs before trial, 
when the court is presented with a motion to suppress evidence.33 
Fourth Amendment challenges (such as a challenge to the legality of a 
search) usually arise in criminal proceedings,34 where they are brought 
by defendants.35 In the motion to suppress evidence, defendants assert 
that evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
that it should be kept out of the criminal proceeding.36 After briefing 
by both sides, courts usually hold a suppression hearing where the 
defendant testifies.37 Then the judge rules on the motion.38  
The suppression analysis for a search has three main parts, 
discussed in greater depth in the following sections. First, a defendant 
must prove that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the area searched.39 If the defendant establishes a reasonable 
                                                 
31 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (relying on a defendant’s 
statements at a suppression hearing in holding that he did not have standing to 
challenge a search). 
32 Cf. Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
33 See Carlisle I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at *3. 
37 See id. at *1. 
38 See id. 
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expectation of privacy, the court will analyze whether a constitutional 
violation occurred.40 Finally, if the court determines that a violation 
occurred, suppression is usually the remedy.41  
 
1. Reasonable expectation of privacy: a threshold inquiry 
 
Before a court will examine whether a search was lawful under 
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must prove that he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area being searched.42 A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is a term of art that refers to a 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.43 Not every 
search conducted by law enforcement is entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.44 A search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
can only occur if the government intrudes upon a place where a person 
expected privacy.45 In this sense, the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy inquiry is a threshold question.46  
Prior to the 1960s, Fourth Amendment rights were tied to property 
rights in the context of warrantless searches.47 That is, there could be 
no unconstitutional search unless the government impeded upon a 
                                                 
40 See United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155–56 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(moving on to assess whether a search was unlawful after determining that a 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched). 
41 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule operates to keep illegally-obtained evidence out of both state and federal courts). 
42 McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
43 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Case for 
Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 809 (2004). 
44 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that a narcotics-
detection dog sniffing the exterior of a car was not a search because the driver did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the air molecules carrying the scent 
of illegal drugs). 
45 Id. at 408. 
46 McGann, 8 F.3d at 1182. 
47 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a wiretap 
was not an unlawful search because the defendant did not have a property interest in 
the telephone wires), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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recognized, tangible property interest.48 However, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Katz v. United States closed the door on overtly 
limiting an individual’s privacy rights along the lines of property 
interests.49 Instead, the Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”50 Katz also introduced a new threshold 
inquiry: the reasonable expectation of privacy.51 A reasonable 
expectation of privacy has two components: (1) a person must 
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the area being 
searched and (2) that expectation must be objectively reasonable.52  
A subjective expectation of privacy exists when an individual has 
exhibited a desire to preserve something as private.53 This usually 
comes in the form of statements made at the time of the search or at 
the suppression hearing.54 Even though this subjective expectation is 
based solely on a defendant’s state of mind, a defendant cannot always 
prove a subjective expectation simply by saying so.55 In the same way 
that courts evaluate the intent of the defendant where intent is a 
necessary element of the offense, the goal is to use existing evidence 
to get a glimpse into the defendant’s mind.56 Accordingly, courts look 
to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a subjective 
                                                 
48 See id. at 464–66. 
49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
50 Id. at 351. 
51 See id. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). 
52 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). 
53 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000). 
54 See United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir 1995) (explaining that it 
would be “almost impossible” for a defendant to demonstrate a subjective 
expectation of privacy without providing an affidavit or testimony). 
55 See United States v. Best, 255 F.Supp.2d 905, 911 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2003) 
(holding that a defendant failed to prove a subjective expectation of privacy when he 
submitted an affidavit saying he expected a residence would remain private). 
56 See Nelson v. Thieret, 793 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing intent 
in the context of murder, the court noted that “intent is a state of mind and may be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances”) (quoting People v. Pagliuca, 119 458 
N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 4th Div. 1983)). 
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expectation of privacy existed.57 This totality-of-the-circumstances 
inquiry encompasses both facts known to officers at the time of the 
search and facts that may be discovered well after the event.58  
Under this approach, a defendant’s assertion that he or she held a 
subjective expectation may be overcome by contrary evidence.59 For 
instance, a defendant may claim in court that he or she expected 
privacy in a bag, but the prosecution may be able to provide witnesses 
saying they saw the defendant publicizing the illicit contents of a bag 
in an attempt to sell drugs.60 A court would not accept this defendant’s 
claim as definitive proof in the face of such contrary evidence.61 
Indeed, the burden for proving a subjective expectation of privacy falls 
on the defendant, and it must be met through a preponderance of the 
evidence.62  
Nevertheless, demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy is 
a fairly low threshold and courts ordinarily find that it is met.63 For 
instance, in California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court was willing 
to entertain the notion that a defendant held a subjective expectation of 
privacy in trash bags he had placed on the curb (even though the court 
held that the expectation was not objectively reasonable).64 In many 
cases, a defendant’s testimony that he or she expected an area would 
be free from government intrusion will be enough to make this 
showing.65  
                                                 
57 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–06 (1980). 
58 See id. at 104–05. 
59 Best, 255 F.Supp.2d at 911. 
60 Cf. id. (rejecting the defendant’s claim that he expected access to a residence 
would be limited to those with keys where a witness testified that he sold drugs out 
of the residence in eight-hour shifts without having a key). 
61 See id.  
62 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). 
63 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“Clearly—and 
understandably—[the defendant] has met the test of manifesting his own subjective 
intent and desire to maintain privacy.”) 
64 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
65 See, e.g., id.; but see United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 2008 WL 
4724282, at * 5–6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that a defendant failed to prove 
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Of course, a subjective expectation of privacy is not enough to 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection; society also must be prepared to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable.66 This step of the inquiry “is 
a value judgment” that looks to whether an expectation of privacy 
would be “[c]onsistent with the aims of a free and open society.”67 In 
determining whether a subjective expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable, courts once again look to the totality of the 
circumstances.68 This is where defendants usually fail if they are 
unable to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy.69 
Ordinarily, it is more difficult to prove that an expectation of privacy is 
objectively reasonable than it is to prove a personal expectation of 
privacy.70 
Individuals can maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy 
against government intrusion even when they expect that other people 
may access the property.71 For example, when two people share a 
home, each may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
                                                                                                                   
subjective expectation of privacy when the only testimony he personally provided 
was an assertion in his memorandum that he “believed he had an expectation of 
privacy”). 
66 As the Supreme Court explained in Rakas v. Illinois,  “[a] burglar plying his 
trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified 
subjective expectation of privacy,” but that does not make it reasonable. 
67 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. 
L. Rev. 349, 403 (1978); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1968) (where 
the Court concluded our society would consider it reasonable to expect that 
conversations in a public phone booth will not be recorded). 
68 See United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying 
the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to both prongs of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy analysis). 
69 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39 (accepting the defendant’s subjective 
expectation with little question, but rejecting the claim that it was objectively 
reasonable). 
70 Whereas a subjective expectation need only exist in a defendant’s mind, the 
objective prong takes into account societal values and judgments. See Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 361. 
71 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368–70 (1968). 
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everyone except the other person—including law enforcement.72 
Likewise, where multiple people share an office, they may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy against everyone except their co-
workers.73 At a certain point, an area may be open to so many people 
that an expectation of privacy is no longer reasonable.74 For example, 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect property that is in plain view 
because no reasonable person would expect it to be private.75 
However, the critical point is that the expectation of privacy exists as 
against governmental intrusion.76 
Once both the subjective and the objective prongs of this analysis 
have been satisfied, an individual has established a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.77 This means that the area searched is subject 
to Fourth Amendment protections.78 In our discussion, we may refer to 
passing through this threshold as a “constitutional moment.” 
 
2. Evaluating searches and seizures 
 
After a defendant has established both prongs of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy analysis, he or she must then prove that a 
constitutional violation occurred.79 As discussed above, 
                                                 
72 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–71 (1974). 
73 See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368–70 (holding that a defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against government intrusion, even though he shared an office 
with co-workers and expected that those co-workers might access his workplace). 
74 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (plurality) (“[S]ome 
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no 
expectation of privacy is reasonable.”) 
75 See id. 
76 See, e.g., Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368–70.  
77 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“Official conduct that does 
not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
78 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 139 (1978). 
79 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (ending the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry after determining that the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy). 
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reasonableness is at the heart of this inquiry.80 Even though both 
searches and seizures are governed by the same clause of the Fourth 





y focuses heavily on constraining the conduct 
of governmental actors.87 
                                                
the same.81 
This Article is primarily concerned with searches, but a brief 
primer on seizures is useful to illustrate a contrast. A person is seized,
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when a governmental 
actor “by means of physical force or show of authority terminates or 
restrains [the person’s] freedom of movement.”82 Courts look t
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a seizure is 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.83 In the 
context of a seizure, however, the “totality of the circumstances” onl
encompasses facts known to officers in the moments preceding the 
seizure.84 This means that facts discovered after an individual has been 
seized cannot be used to justify the seizure.85 For example, if an 
officer discovers an illegal weapon on a person he or she has seized, 
that weapon cannot be used to justify the initial seizure.86 In this 
sense, the seizure inquir
 
80 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality) (stating that the 
Court must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness for a workplace 
search). 
81 Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 557–58 (1980) (using 
the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to determine whether a defendant was 
seized), with Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2647 
(2009) (Thomas J., concurring) (stating that the standard for a search is that it must 
be reasonable at its inception and in its scope). 
82 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
83 See United States v. Grogg, 534 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In 
evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop, we examine the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop”). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 Cf. id. 
87 See supra Part I.A. 
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Searches implicating the Fourth Amendment may occur with or 
without a warrant,88 although here we are only concerned with the 
latter. Even though warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,89 a 
warrantless search does not necessarily violate the Fourth 
Amendment.90 The government can overcome this negative 
presumption by showing that a warrantless search was reasonable both 
at its inception and in its scope.91 In fact, the government is frequently 
able to justify warrantless searches in this manner, and courts have 
recognized that they are a valuable tool for law enforcement.92 
Generally, three levels of suspicion will justify a warrantless 
search at its inception. At the lowest level, a search is permissible 
absent any suspicion so long as an officer obtains consent from the 
person being searched.93 An intermediate level of suspicion is called 
reasonable suspicion.94 This is a term of art referring to suspicion 
based on specific and articulable facts,95 and justified on the basis on 
officer safety.96 These searches are also known as Terry frisks. The 
term refers to the seminal Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, 
where the Court first recognized reasonable suspicion as a valid basis 
                                                 
88 Compare United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1278 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(search conducted pursuant to a warrant), with Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (warrantless search). 
89 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  
90 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)  
91 See id. at 27–28. 
92 Id. at 24 (stating that “we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law 
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence 
in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest,” in holding that a 
warrantless search was reasonable). 
93 See United States v. Friend, 151 Fed.  App’x. 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (searches conducted pursuant to valid consent do not require any suspicion). 
94 United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2006). 
95 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
96 Id. at 28, 30. 
515 
13
Karampelas: That's Not My Bag, Baby: The Seventh Circuit Tackles Fourth Amend
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
for a search.97 The third and highest level of suspicion is probable 
cause.98 
Once the requisite level of suspicion has been satisfied, it defines 
the scope of the search.99 This means that a search may not be broader 
or more invasive than necessary to satisfy an officer’s initial purposes 
for conducting the search.100 For example, a search based on 
reasonable suspicion must be brief and last only as long as necessary 
to satisfy the officer’s initial suspicion.101 This requirement recognizes 
that this intermediate level of suspicion justifies only a limited 
intrusion into an individual’s privacy.102 Certainly, in the course of 
conducting a Terry frisk, an officer may uncover evidence that creates 
a higher level of suspicion, and that is constitutionally permissible.103 
For instance, an officer may conduct a Terry frisk of an individual 
fleeing the scene of a crime, and the officer may find illegal drugs 
during the search. This discovery may justify a more extensive search 
or the search of another area, such as the person’s home.104 However, 
                                                 
97 See United States v. Robinson, 615 F.3d 804, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2010). 
98 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (recognizing that 
probable cause is a higher level of suspicion that reasonable suspicion). 
99 Terry, 392 U.S. at 28–29 (explaining that the scope of a warrantless search is 
limited to the initial justification for the search). 
100 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (holding 
that roving border searches are justified on less than probable cause because they are 
brief and so the intrusion is minimal); United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 511 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“the less protracted and intrusive a search is, the less suspicion the 
police need in order to be authorized by the Fourth Amendment to conduct it, and 
vice versa”). 
101 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (“The scope of the search must be strictly tied to and 
justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
102 See id. 
103 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881–82 (stating that officers who make 
brief investigative stops at the border may conduct more extensive searches if they 
are justified by a higher level of suspicion). 
104 See also id. 
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courts must remain vigilant of post hoc justification: the discovery of 
illicit goods will not validate unlawful means.105 
 
3. The exclusionary rule: a remedy 
 
When government actors conduct an illegal search, the remedy is 
found in the exclusionary rule.106 In criminal proceedings, the 
exclusionary rule directs courts to suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.107 When evidence is suppressed, 
it cannot be used in the government’s case-in-chief.108 The evidence 
may still be used for impeachment purposes.109 However, without the 
suppressed evidence, the government is often unable to prove its case 
and the charges are dropped.110 Although the exclusionary rule was 
created to safeguard against constitutional violations,111 the rule itself 
is a court-made remedy and not a constitutional mandate.112  
“Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal 
mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.”113 Despite its deterrent 
objective, the exclusionary rule has been limited not along the lines of 
                                                 
105 United States v. One 1968 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, Vin No. J8129552, 730 
F.Supp. 1434, 1439 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5 1990) (“[T]he law of search and seizure does 
not reason from results—it does not permit post hoc ergo propter hoc justification of 
a search.”). 
106 MARK L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE 
POLICE 371 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. 2007). 
107 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). 
108 Id. 
109 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1980). Some state courts 
have eliminated that use of illegally-obtained evidence altogether. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Fini, 531 N.E.2d 570, 573–74 (Mass. 1988). 
110 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). 
111 Without the exclusionary rule, “the Fourth Amendment would have been 
reduced to a form of words.” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
112 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
113 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
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whether officers have committed a constitutional violation (i.e., an 
unlawful search), but based on whether the individual claiming the 
protection is able to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy.114 This 
limitation is created by the Fourth Amendment standing 
requirement.115 In short, the exclusionary rule will only be applied in 
cases where a defendant can prove that a Fourth Amendment violation 
infringed his or her own privacy interests.116 
 
C. Fourth Amendment Standing: A Policy Decision 
 
Although we use the word “standing” to describe whether a 
person can bring a Fourth Amendment challenge, the term is 
somewhat of a misnomer. Like the ordinary standing inquiry governed 
by Article III, so-called “Fourth Amendment standing” governs who 
can bring a constitutional challenge.117 Unlike Article III standing, it is 
evaluated in the context of substantive Fourth Amendment law.118 
Specifically, it refers to the threshold reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy inquiry.119 The Ninth Circuit provides a useful primer on 
Fourth Amendment standing: 
The term “standing” is often used to describe an inquiry into 
who may assert a particular fourth amendment claim. Fourth 
[A]mendment standing is quite different, however, from 
“case or controversy” determinations of [A]rticle III standing. 
Rather, it is a matter of substantive [F]ourth [A]mendment 
law; to say that a party lacks [F]ourth [A]mendment standing 
is to say that [the party’s] reasonable expectation of privacy 
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has not been infringed. It is with this understanding that we 
use “standing” as a shorthand term.120 
The standing inquiry exists because “Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights which, like other constitutional rights, may not be 
vicariously asserted.”121 A defendant may be harmed by the 
introduction of damaging evidence, but that does not necessarily mean 
that the defendant’s own Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated.122  
Fourth Amendment standing issues commonly arise in situations 
where a defendant seeks to suppress the search of property belonging 
to a third party.123 For instance, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, a defendant 
sought to suppress the admission of illegal drugs found in his 
girlfriend’s purse.124 Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a 
search depends on whether the defendant can demonstrate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.125  
 
1. Substantive law 
 
In this Article, the “substantive law” of Fourth Amendment 
standing refers to whether the facts in a given case are legally 
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. This comes 
into play most frequently in evaluating the objective prong of the 
inquiry.126 Because the objective prong uses a reasonableness 
standard, courts are able to craft near-bright-line rules for those 
                                                 
120 United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669–70 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139–50) (internal citations omitted). 
121 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 See e.g. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980). This may also be 
due to the fact that prosecutors are less likely to challenge defendants’ privacy 
interest in property they actually own. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 
(1980) (although property ownership is not controlling, it is factor to be considered 
in evaluating a reasonable expectation of privacy).  
124 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 102. 
125 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139. 
126 See infra Part III.B-C. 
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expectations that society is prepared to consider reasonable.127 For 
instance, the Supreme Court has made clear that individuals ma





                                                
128 but not in the numbers they dial.129 In f
some courts view the objective prong as a question of pure law and
subjective prong as a question of pure fact.130 
Although rules are more difficult to discern with respect to the 
subjective prong,131 certain cases are instructive. One such case is the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Amaral-Estrada.132 In 
Amaral-Estrada the defendant challenged the search of his friend’s 
car.133 Even though a police officer watched the defendant exit the car 
and found the keys in the defendant’s pocket,134 the defendant 
continued to deny knowledge of the car and its contents.135 When the 
officer searched the car, he found a black duffel bag in the backseat 
containing over $250,000 in cash.136 At the suppression hearing, the 
defendant stated that a friend had loaned him the car.137 The defendant 
also testified that his friend (the car owner) instructed him to leave the 
 
127 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that it is 
objectively reasonable believe a conversation on a public pay phone would not be 
recorded by police without a warrant); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) 
(holding that it is objectively unreasonable to entertain an expectation of privacy in 
the phone numbers dialed from a private phone because the telephone company 
keeps a permanent record of everyone’s calls). 
128 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
129 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
130 See e.g. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210–13 (1986); United 
States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997) (making the distinction in 
the abandonment context). 
131 See McKennon, 814 F.2d at 1543. 
132 United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007). 
133 Id. at 825. 
134 Id. at 824 (the officer used the key found in the defendant’s pocket during a 
Terry frisk to unlock the car). 
135 Id. at 823–24. 
136 Id. at 824. 
137 Id. at 823. 
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car in a certain parking lot, and told him that while he was gone 
somebody would put something in the backseat of the car.138 Applying 
the two-prong reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry set forth in 
Katz, the court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the 
car search because he did not exhibit a legitimate privacy interest in 
the car.139  
In holding that the defendant failed to exhibit a subjective140 
expectation of privacy in the car, the court pointed to the following 
factors: the defendant expected others to enter the car; the defendant 
expected items to be left in the car (and possibly also removed); the 
defendant testified that he did not care about the duffel bag found in 
the backseat because it was not his bag and it was not his car; and the 
defendant initially denied knowledge of the car when questioned by 
police.141 This case provides a clear example of a defendant’s 
substantive failure to prove a subjective expectation of privacy.142 This 
is a substantive failure, in the sense that the facts surrounding this case 
suggest that the defendant could not legally prove his subjective 
expectation,143 rather than an evidentiary failure, where a defendant 
simply fails to put on enough evidence to demonstrate a subjective 
expectation that likely existed.144 Here, the substantive lesson is that a 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 827. 
140 The court states the defendant “failed to manifest any sort of actual or 
subjective expectation of privacy.” Id. While this might refer to both prongs of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, in this case the court is using it to refer 
to the subjective prong. Id. This is because the court phrases the first prong of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry as whether “the defendant exhibits an 
actual or subjective expectation of privacy.” Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See explanation of “substantive law” Part II.C.1 supra. 
143 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding that a 
defendant failed to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy where he admitted 
that he did not expect the area searched would remain free from governmental 
intrusion). 
144 See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (remanding the case 
where defendants erroneously relied on automatic standing and did not attempt to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
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defendant must admit to at least having knowledge of the area 
searched in order to claim a subjective expectation of privacy.145 
The test a court uses is another substantive component in 
assessing a subjective expectation of privacy.146 Although the 
overwhelming majority of decisions (in this and all other circuits) 
apply the Katz test,147 this has not always been the case in the Seventh 
Circuit.148  
In United States v. Peters, the court acknowledged that the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry “embraces two discrete 
questions” (the subjective and objective prongs),149 but the court 
adopted a factor test instead.150 Under this test, five factors are 
relevant in determining whether an individual has shown a reasonable 
expectation of privacy: (1) whether the defendant has a possessory 
interest or ownership interest in the place searched; (2) whether the 
defendant has the right to exclude others from the place; (3) whether a 
defendant has exhibited a subjective expectation that the area would 
remain free from government intrusion; (4) whether the defendant 
took normal precautions to defend his privacy; and (5) whether the 
defendant was legitimately on the premises when the search 
occurred.151 No single factor is talismanic to this inquiry.152  
 
                                                 
145 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827. 
146 See explanation of “substantive law” in Part II.C.1 supra. 
147 Jeremy C. Smith, The USA Patriot Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy Protected By the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National 
Security, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 412, 441 (2003) (the Katz test is the predominant test for 
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists). 
148 See United States v. Mitchell, 64 F.3d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1995); Clark v. 
United States, No. 93-3530, 46 F.3d 1133, at *3 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Duprey, 895 F.2d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogation on other grounds recognized 
by United States v. Bolivar, 90 Fed.  App’x. 153, 155 (7th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1281 (7th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds. 
149 Peters, 791 F.2d at 1281. 
150 See United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1981). 
151 Peters, 791 F.2d at 1281. 
152 Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1154. 
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2. Evidentiary burden 
 
The question of whether a movant has established a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in arguing a motion to suppress is a separate 
(but related) inquiry from whether the facts in a given case could 
support a reasonable expectation of privacy.153 Indeed, there are cases 
where the facts may be sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, but where the defendant has failed to make a sufficient 
evidentiary showing.154 This is the distinction between the substantive 
and the evidentiary requirements for establishing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
In Rawlings, the Supreme Court made clear that defendants bear 
the burden of proving a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
challenging a search.155 Moreover, defendants must prove their 
reasonable expectation of privacy through a preponderance of the 
evidence.156 This means that mere assertions may not be enough to 
carry this burden.157 Finally, this burden must be carried at the 
suppression hearing.158  
When courts have held that a movant failed to meet his or her 
evidentiary burden in a motion to suppress, it is often because the 
movant has failed to provide sufficient testimony as to his or her 
subjective expectation of privacy.159 For instance, in United States v. 
                                                 
153 See discussion of evidentiary burdens Part II.C.2 infra. 
154 See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (remanding the case 
where defendants erroneously relied on automatic standing and did not attempt to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
155 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980). 
156 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). 
157 United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 2008 WL 4724282, at *5–6 
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that a defendant failed to prove subjective 
expectation of privacy when the only testimony he personally provided was an 
assertion in his memorandum that he “believed he had an expectation of privacy”).  
158 See Rawlings at 104–05. 
159 See United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1080 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that a defendant failed to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy because he did 
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Ruth, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant failed to meet his 
burden because he did not put forth enough evidence to establish a 
subjective expectation of privacy.160 The defendant in that case did not 
make any statements pertaining to his subjective expectation of 
privacy because he feared that evidence would be used against him at 
trial.161 Instead, he relied on facts from the affidavit accompanying a 
search warrant and the testimony of a government agent.162 However, 
the court explained that the defendant bears the burden of establishing 
a privacy interest, and thus it is “almost impossible” to find a 
subjective expectation of privacy without some testimony or affidavit 
from the defendant.163 This is because the subjective prong of this 
inquiry can only be proven by evidence of what was in the defendant’s 
mind.164  
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. 
CARLISLE 
 
The issue of Fourth Amendment standing was recently addressed 
by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Carlisle.165 In ruling on a 
defendant’s motion to suppress, the court held that the defendant could 
not challenge the search because he failed to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.166 Specifically, the court held that the 
defendant failed to prove a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
contents of the backpack that was searched by police.167 Because 
                                                                                                                   
not testify or submit an affidavit regarding his subjective expectation); United States 
v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1995). 
160 Ruth, 65 F.3d at 605. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 604–05. 
163 Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
164 Id. 
165 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2010). 
166 Id. at 759. 
167 Id. at 759–60. 
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standing under the Fourth Amendment is a necessarily fact-specific 
inquiry,168 a recitation of the facts is required under this analysis.  
 
A. The Facts 
 
In February 2008, Eddie Lamar Carlisle was arrested after police 
officers in Fort Wayne, Indiana, visited the home of Michael Chapman 
to investigate suspected drug trafficking.169 While executing a warrant 
down the street from Chapman’s residence, officers saw people 
coming and going from Chapman’s house in a manner indicative of 
drug activity.170 However, officers did not even need reasonable basis 
for visiting Chapman’s home, due to his status as a home detainee.171 
As part of home detention, Chapman and all adults living in his home 
signed a consent form authorizing unannounced searches of the 
residence.172 As a result, officers were authorized to search Chapman’s 
home at any time, without a warrant.173 If Carlisle had signed the 
consent form, he would have essentially forfeited his right to challenge 
the search.174 But Carlisle did not sign this form.175  
Police officers knocked on Chapman’s front door and identified 
themselves as law enforcement.176 After the knock, prior to the door 
opening, officers saw people moving around inside the house and 
heard breaking glass.177 One officer saw a person look through the 
                                                 
168 United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The 
Supreme Court… has always stressed the fact-specific nature of Fourth Amendment 
inquiries.”). 
169 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 753. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Carlisle I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
173 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 753. 
174 See id. 
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vertical blinds on the side of the house.178 Then, before the front door 
was opened, officers saw a man exit through the back door.179 The 
man looked nervous and he paused for a moment to look around, 
before running toward the alley behind the garage.180 One officer 
ordered the man to stop and pulled out his taser; another officer drew 
his gun.181 The man lay down on the ground and placed the backpack 
he was carrying on the ground beside him.182 Officers handcuffed the 
man and brought him, along with the backpack, inside.183 At that 
point, officers did not know the identity of the man who was, of 
course, Eddie Lamar Carlisle.184  
Once inside, Carlisle consented to the officers’ request for 
identification, at which point they knew he was not Chapman.185 
Officers conducted a Terry frisk to ensure that Carlisle was not 
carrying any weapons, which he was not.186 Then things got 
interesting (for our purposes, at least). Without obtaining Carlisle’s 
consent,187 one of the officers opened the backpack and searched its 
contents.188 The officer testified that he was unable to determine the 
contents of the backpack without opening it.189 However, there is no 
evidence that the officer attempted to conduct a Terry-frisk of the 
backpack prior to opening it.190 Additionally, Carlisle was still 
handcuffed when officers searched the backpack and he did not have 










187 Id. at *3. 
188 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). 
189 Carlisle I, 2008 WL 5111346, at *3. 
190 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 753–54.  
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access to it.191 Upon searching the backpack, the officer discovered 
drugs and drug paraphernalia.192  
After reading Carlisle his Miranda rights, the officer asked him 
about the backpack.193 Carlisle told the officer he took the backpack 
from inside the house, without knowing what was inside it.194 Carlisle 
did not claim or deny ownership of the backpack at that time.195 At the 
suppression hearing, Carlisle testified that the backpack belonged to 
Chapman, who asked him to put it in the garage.196 Carlisle also 
reiterated that he did not know what was in the backpack.197 
 
B. The Decision 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision is unusual in that it rested its 
holding on Carlisle’s purported failure to establish a subjective 
expectation of privacy.198 When holding that defendants are not 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, courts more commonly rest 
their decision on the objective prong of the analysis, by determining 
that a defendant’s belief is not reasonable.199 Although the Seventh 
Circuit considered both prongs of the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy inquiry (perhaps inadvertently, as a result of using the Peters 




                                                 
191 Carlisle I, 2008 WL 5111346, at *3. 






198 See id. at 759–60. 
199 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1986). 
200 See discussion of the Peters test Part III.B infra. 
201 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759–60. 
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1. District Court 
 
In December 2008, the Northern District of Indiana denied 
Carlisle’s motion to suppress the backpack search.202 First, the court 
determined that Carlisle did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of the backpack.203 Relying on Fourth 
Amendment standing cases like Rakas v. Illinois, the court reiterated 
“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted 
vicariously; in other words, the legality of a search of another person’s 
property cannot be asserted to suppress evidence located as a result of 
the search.”204 Accordingly, the district court held that Carlisle did not 
have standing to challenge the backpack search.205 
The court based this conclusion on Carlisle’s testimony at the 
suppression hearing “that the backpack belonged to Chapman, that 
Chapman asked Carlisle to take [the backpack] outside to the garage, 
and that Carlisle had no knowledge of [the backpack’s] contents.”206 
The court characterized these statements as an implicit disavowal of 
Carlisle’s privacy interest in the backpack.207 Ironically, the court 
noted that “no magic or literal words” are required to disclaim a 
privacy interest,208 but it did not comment on whether a defendant is 
required to recite any specific language to prove a privacy interest. The 
court recognized that Carlisle “didn’t claim or deny ownership of the 
backpack” when questioned by an officer, immediately following the 
search.209 Although these facts support Carlisle’s reasonable 
                                                 
202 Carlisle I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
203 Id., at *10. 
204 Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1974)). 
205 Carlisle I, 2008 WL 5111346, at *10. 
206 Id. at *9. 
207 Id. at *10. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at *9. 
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expectation of privacy, it was apparently not enough to overcome the 
statements he made under oath at the suppression hearing.210  
Indeed, the court stated that Carlisle could not “have it both ways” 
by claiming the backpack did not belong to him and then attempting to 
assert a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the bag and its 
contents.211 However, this statement seems to overlook Supreme Court 
cases holding that property rights do not control a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.212 The court also rejected Carlisle’s argument 
that “since he neither claimed ownership of the backpack nor denied 
ownership of it, the police had no right to search it without first 
reading him his Miranda rights and, possibly, without first pressing 
him to expressly state whether or not the bag belonged to him.”213 The 
court cautioned that suppressing the search in this case could create a 
dangerous precedent whereby suspects in a similar situation would be 
free to remain silent about ownership of an object, and then succeed 
on a Fourth Amendment challenge while disclaiming any ownership 
interest in the object.214 Once again, the court’s focus on ownership is 
somewhat misplaced in light of Katz.215  
After his motion to suppress was denied, Carlisle entered a 
conditional guilty plea216 and appealed the ruling to the Seventh 
Circuit.217  
 
2. Seventh Circuit 
 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying 
the motion to suppress.218 While the standard of review is somewhat 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at *10.  
212 See e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
213 Id. at *9. 
214 Id. 
215 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
216 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Carlisle pleaded guilty but 
reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.”). 
217 See id. 
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unclear, the court appeared to be evaluating the district court’s 
decision de novo.219 The Carlisle court explained that when reviewing 
the denial of a motion to suppress, questions of fact are reviewed for 
clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de novo.220 However, 
the court suggested that “when ‘what happened?’ is not at issue, the 
ultimate resolution… is a question of law [to be] review[ed] de 
novo.”221 When the court articulated this standard, it explicitly 
mentioned reasonable suspicion and probable cause—but not a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.222 However, in the absence of any 
identifiable factual dispute with respect to “what happened?” it is 
likely the court reviewed the decision below de novo.223  
At the start of its analysis, the court briefly distinguished this case 
from abandonment cases, where a defendant denies any interest in the 
property at the time of the search (or more precisely, immediately prior 
to the search).224 For instance, if a defendant tells a police officer prior 
to a search that the contents of a bag do not belong to him, the bag is 
deemed abandoned.225 Abandoned property does not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection,226 so any subsequent search is not a 
constitutional moment.227 The court noted that “Carlisle did not claim 
nor deny ownership of the bag at the time of the search.”228 
                                                                                                                   
218 Id. at 760. 
219 See id. at 754. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. at 757–60 (search analysis); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause should be reviewed de novo”). 
224 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 757. 
225 See Bond v. United States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1996). 
226 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 757. 
227 See discussion of reasonable expectation of privacy Part I.B.1 supra. 
228 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 757. 
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Accordingly, the court held that abandonment cases were 
inapplicable.229  
While the court correctly rejected the abandonment framework, its 
framing of the issue is somewhat dubious. The court cast the issue as: 
“under what circumstances does a defendant have a subjective privacy 
interest in a piece of property when ownership is ambiguous at the 
time of the search?”230 This formulation ignores the fact that officers 
never asked Carlisle whether the backpack belonged to him prior to 
searching it.231 Ownership of the bag only became ambiguous after the 
search, when Carlisle denied knowing what was in the bag and made 
no statement about whether he owned it.232  
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit determined that Carlisle did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack.233 However, 
the court also noted, “this case is closer to the line than it appears at 
first glance.”234 The court cited Rakas for the proposition that Fourth 
Amendment standing issues should be evaluated in the context of 
substantive Fourth Amendment law—specifically, in terms of whether 
a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.235 The court also 
pointed out that Rawlings placed the burden of establishing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the defendant.236 According to 
the Seventh Circuit, the Rawlings court rejected the defendant’s claim 
that he had a subjective expectation of privacy because he could not 
exclude other people from the area searched and because he admitted 
that he did not expect the area would remain free from governmental 
intrusion.237 In light of the defendant’s admission, which effectively 
                                                 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 The officer did not ask Carlisle if the backpack belonged to him until after 
opening it and discovering illicit items. See id. at 754. 
232 See id. 
233 Id. at 756. 
234 Id. at 759. 
235 Id. at 756. 
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disclaimed his privacy interest, the ability to exclude others is 
somewhat irrelevant.238 Finally, the court noted that Salvucci 
abolished the notion of automatic standing for crimes of posse 239ssion.  
                                                
After laying out the Supreme Court framework, the court 
discussed precedent from the Seventh Circuit. The court explained that 
the five-factor test from Peters was not on point.240 The court then 
discussed its more recent decision in Amaral-Estrada.241 Although 
Amaral-Estrada did not explicitly outline what defeated the 
defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy,242 the Carlisle court’s 
interpretation was that the defendant lacked a subjective expectation of 
privacy because “based on his own testimony, he expected others to 
enter the car to leave or remove items.”243 The Carlisle court 
acknowledged that neither the Supreme Court cases nor the decisions 
from its own circuit were “factually identical” to Carlisle’s 
circumstances.244 However, the court used facts from Rawlings and 
Amaral-Estrada to evaluate Carlisle’s search within the Peters 
framework.245  
Ultimately, the court held that Carlisle lacked standing to 
challenge the backpack search because he lacked a reasonable 
 
238 Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding that a 
defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in drugs he put in his 
girlfriend’s purse where the defendant testified that he did not expect the purse to 
remain free from governmental intrusion), with United States v. McKennon, 814 
F.2d 1539, 1542–43 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in drugs he placed in his female companion’s bag, 
in the absence of a statement disclaiming a subjective expectation of privacy). 
239 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 758. 
240 Id. at 759. 
241 See id. at 758–59. 
242 See United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (the 
court merely stated that “[the defendant] failed to manifest any sort of actual or 
subjective expectation of privacy,” and then cited several factors proving that he 
lacked standing to challenge the search). 
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expectation of privacy.246 Nonetheless, the court recognized that at 
least two factors tipped decidedly in favor of finding a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.247 Namely, the court found that Carlisle was 
legitimately in possession of the property, unlike the defendant in 
Rawlings.248 Likewise, the court found that Carlisle “indicated that he 
intended to maintain privacy in the bag by holding onto it as he left the 
house and by keeping it closed.”249 Thus, the fourth and fifth Peters 
factors counsel for finding a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Judge Flaum called the issue of exclusivity (the second Peters 
factor) “murkier.”250 The court acknowledged that Carlisle had the 
right to exclude all others, except Chapman, while he was in 
possession of the backpack.251 This distinguished Carlisle’s situation 
from the defendant in Amaral-Estrada,252 who expected that other 
people—people he did not know—would access the car.253 The court 
then made the leap from a “right to exclude others” (the second Peters 
factor) to “exclusive control.”254 Certainly, the right to exclude some 
people is different from the right to exclude everyone; however, the 
court seems to be using “exclusive control” as shorthand for the fact 
that Carlisle did not know who had accessed the backpack before he 
received it.255 The Seventh Circuit stated that Carlisle’s own testimony 
at the suppression hearing “strongly cut… against any claim of 
exclusive control.”256 Specifically, the court pointed to Carlisle’s 
statement that “he did not know what was in the bag or who was using 
                                                 
246 Id. 





252 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
253 United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007).  
254 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
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the bag immediately prior to his taking it.”257 This statement made 
Carlisle’s situation analogous to that of the defendant in Rawlings, 
who lacked control over who accessed the property just prior to the 
search.258 Interestingly, this is the only time the court analogized 
Carlisle’s situation to another case.259 
The court did not explicitly address whether Carlisle had a 
possessory or ownership interest in the backpack (the first Peters 
factor).260 Even without this component, the court held that Carlisle’s 
“complete lack of testimony” about a subjective expectation of privacy 
“pushe[d] this case completely over the line.”261 The court stated, 
“[t]he record lacks any evidence of [a] subjective expectation and 
Carlisle’s testimony cuts against a finding of any subjective 
expectation of privacy in the bag since he disclaimed ownership or 
even knowledge of its contents.”262 Accordingly, the court held that 
Carlisle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
backpack.263 Because Carlisle did not satisfy this threshold inquiry, the 
court did not examine whether the backpack search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.264 Indeed, without a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the search did not rise to the level of a constitutional moment worthy 
of Fourth Amendment protection.265 
 
III. MEASURING A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
 
The Peters test is not an appropriate standard for measuring a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cases like Carlisle. Instead, the 
court should have used the two-prong reasonable-expectation-of-
                                                 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 See id. at 750–60. 
260 See id. 
261 Id. at 759. 
262 Id. at 759–60. 
263 Id. at 760. 
264 See id. 
265 See discussion of reasonable expectation of privacy Part I.B.1 supra. 
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privacy inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court in Katz. The two-prong 
inquiry makes clear the subjective and the objective expectation of 
privacy are two separate steps in the analysis.266 The Katz test allows a 
court to clearly address each step of the analysis, without confusing 
which facts go toward proving a particular type of expectation 
(subjective or objective).267 Further, the two-prong test prevents 
conflating a defendant’s evidentiary burden, which usually comes into 
play when proving a subjective expectation of privacy, with the 
substantive legal requirement of proving both prongs.268  
It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit is not the only circuit 
to use the five-factor test.269 However, the analysis in this Article 
pertains only to the Seventh Circuit. This Circuit’s interpretation and 
application of the Peters test suggest that it should not be used in most 
circumstances.270 And even where it is not wholly inapplicable, the 
Peters test remains a second-best to the two-prong inquiry.271  
 
A. Understanding the Peters Test 
 
The five-factor test from Peters was first introduced by the Fifth 
Circuit in United States v. Haydel.272 In that case, a defendant sought 
to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in gambling records he 
stored at his parents’ house, under their bed.273 Although the court 
phrased the inquiry as “whether [the defendant] had a legitimate 
                                                 
266 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring). 
267 See infra Part III.B. 
268 Id. 
269 See, e.g., United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 
United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1981)); United States v. 
Gomez, 276 F.3d 694, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1155); 
United States v. Breland, 715 F.Supp. 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Haydel, 649 F.2d 
at 1154–55). 
270 See infra Part III.B. 
271 See infra Part III.C. 
272 Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1154–55; see United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 
1281 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1155)). 
273 Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1154. 
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expectation of privacy,” it was referring to both prongs of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry.274 This becomes evident 
when the court concedes that the defendant clearly “exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy,” but goes on to use the factors to 
determine whether that expectation was reasonable.275 This means that 
the Peters test is not geared towards evaluating a solely subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
Moreover, the “factors” in the test are culled from various 
Supreme Court decisions on Fourth Amendment standing.276 While 
the Court may seem like an appropriate authority to rely upon wh
fashioning a constitutional test, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is 
necessarily fact-specific.
en 
                                                
277 Simply because certain facts were present 
and relevant in one case, does not mean that they will be relevant in 
every case.278  
Since adopting this test, the Seventh Circuit has only applied it a 
handful of times.279 As noted above, the Amaral-Estrada court did not 
apply the test.280 This Peters test is no more prevalent in the lower 
 
274 See id. Not to be confused with the term “actual expectation of privacy,” 
which courts have used as a proxy for a subjective expectation of privacy. See 
United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (2007). 
275 Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1155. 
276 See id. at 1154–55 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978); 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98, 104–05 (1980)). 
277 See Haydel, 649 F.2d at 1154–55. 
278 See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (“[W]e have treated 
reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely 
to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given 
case.”).  
279 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 64 F.3d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Clark v. United States, No. 93-3530, 46 F.3d 1133, at *3 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Duprey, 895 F.2d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogation on other grounds 
recognized by United States v. Bolivar, 90 Fed.  App’x. 153, 155 (7th Cir. 2004). 
280 See United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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courts within the Seventh Circuit.281 In fact, the district court in 
Carlisle did not apply the Peters test.282  
Interestingly, every time the Seventh Circuit has used the five-
factor test, the court has found the defendant lacked standing to contest 
the search.283 Of course, this is merely an observation and it does not 
necessarily suggest that the factor test is skewed against defendants. 
Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit formulated the test in United States v. 
Haydel, the court did find that the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.284 However, this trend in the Seventh Circuit 
may suggest that the Peters test skews the proper inquiry, making it 
more difficult for defendants to understand and meet their burden.285 
Carlisle is the first time the Seventh Circuit has used the Peters 
test in more than fifteen years.286 The Carlisle decision characterized 
Peters as giving the court “occasion to address the issue of when a 
defendant has a subjective privacy interest.”287 While this may be true, 
                                                 
281 See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 2008 WL 4724282, at 
*5 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008); United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 
WL 3197181, at *17 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 006); United States v. Hamilton, No. 91-
CR-163, 1992 WL 26905, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1992); United States v. Schuster, 
775 F.Supp. 297, 300 (W.D. Wis. Sep. 6, 1990). 
282 See Carlisle I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
283 See, e.g., Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Mitchell, 64 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1995); Clark v. United States, No. 93-3530, 
46 F.3d 1133, at *4 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Duprey, 895 F.2d 303, 310 (7th 
Cir. 1989), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. Bolivar, 90 
Fed.  App’x. 153, 155 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 
2008 WL 4724282, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008); United States v. Bermudez, No. 
IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *17 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006); United 
States v. Hamilton, No. 91-CR-163, 1992 WL 26905, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1992); 
United States v. Schuster, 775 F.Supp. 297, 300 (W.D. Wis. Sep. 6, 1990). 
284 United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981). 
285 See discussion of the Peters test’s effect on a defendant’s evidentiary 
burden Part III.B infra. 
286 See Mitchell, 64 F.3d at 1109 (the Seventh Circuit’s most recent application 
of the Peters test, prior to Carlisle). 
287 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 758. 
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the Peters test itself does not aid in that endeavor.288 Even when it was 
introduced, the Peters test was not used, or intended, to evaluate a 
strictly subjective expectation of privacy.289  
 
B. Problems with applying the Peters test  
 
First, the Peters test is somewhat misleading, because it is not a 
factor test at all. Ordinarily, in a factor test, no single factor is 
dispositive.290 However, the Peters test combines both the objective 
and the subjective prongs of the Katz test.291 Both of these prongs 
must be met to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.292 Yet, 
whether a defendant exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy or not 
is one of the five Peters factors.293 Nevertheless, this factor is 
dispositive because a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot exist 
without a subjective expectation of privacy.294  
Second, the Peters test convolutes the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy inquiry. The vast majority of cases analyzing a defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy use the two-prong inquiry.295 In this 
                                                 
288 See infra Part III.B.  
289 See United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) (evaluating 
both the subjective and the objective prongs). 
290 See CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 678 (7th Cir. 
2001) (in an equitable balancing test, so single factor is dispositive); see also United 
States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981) (no one factor is talismanic to 
this inquiry). 
291 See supra Part III.A. 
292 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring). 
293 See Peters, 791 F.2d at 1281. Some jurisdictions use a modified four-factor 
version of the Peters test, whereby the third Peters factor (the subjective 
expectation) is eliminated, and the remaining four factors inform the court’s 
assessment of both the subjective and the objective prongs. See, e.g., In re Kerlo, 311 
B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Melucci, 888 F.2d 200, 202 
(1st Cir. 1989) (using the other four Peters factors, along with “the totality of the 
circumstances” to evaluate both prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy). 
294 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
295 Jeremy C. Smith, supra note 152, at 441 (the Katz test is the predominant 
test for determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists). 
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more common analysis, it is clear that certain facts go toward proving 
a subjective expectation, while others are only relevant insofar as they 
affect whether that expectation is objectively reasonable.296 However, 
the Peters test forces courts to consider both prongs at once.297 Along 
with inquiring whether a defendant exhibited a subjective expectation 
of privacy, the test asks whether the defendant: had an ownership or 
possessory interest; had the right to exclude others; took normal 
precaution to ensure privacy; and possessed the property 
legitimately.298 In Carlisle, where the defendant testified about his 
knowledge and expectation surrounding the backpack, these further 
inquiries go toward whether that expectation was objectively 
reasonable.299 By holding that Carlisle had no subjective expectation 
of privacy,300 the court did not need to address the objective prong.301  
Moreover, cases using the Katz test do not fit so easily into the 
Peters framework.302 The difficulty of shoehorning a two-prong 
inquiry into a five-factor test is demonstrated by the court’s analysis in 
Carlisle.303 For instance, the court points out that both Carlisle and the 
                                                 
296 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (evaluating 
the subjective prong by considering that defendants asserted a privacy interest in 
their trash and by evaluating the credibility of that assertion, while looking to more 
general evidence—such as that “animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
members of the public” could access the trash bags—in evaluating the objective 
prong). 
297 See supra Part III.A. 
298 Peters, 791 F.2d at 1281. 
299 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
300 Id. 
301 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40–41 (moving on to evaluate whether an 
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable only after having found that the 
defendant subjectively expected privacy). In the name of judicial restraint, a court’s 
ruling should be limited to resolving the dispute. See Jeffrey W. Childers, Kyllo v. 
United States: A Temporary Reprieve from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of 
the Home, 81 N.C. L.Rev 728, 755 (2003) (criticizing the Court in Kyllo v. United 
States for going further then necessary in its reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
holding). 
302 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980). 
303 See, e.g., Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
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defendant in Rawlings lacked control over who had access to the 
searched property immediately prior to the search.304 However, the 
Rawlings court did not interpret the defendant’s lack of control over 
the purse as evidence against a subjective expectation of privacy; 
instead the court saw this as a failure to take “normal precautions” to 
maintain privacy.305 The Seventh Circuit found just the opposite, 
holding that Carlisle did take normal precautions to maintain privacy 
in the backpack “by holding onto it as he left the house and by keeping 
it closed.”306 Moreover, the question of whether a defendant took 
normal precautions to maintain privacy goes towards the objective 
prong of the inquiry.307 This confusion persists even though the Peters 
test is purportedly based on Rawlings.308  
Third, the Peters test conflates the defendant’s evidentiary burden 
with the substantive legal requirements of proving an expectation of 
privacy. Many courts explicitly separate factual and legal questions 
when conducting a reasonable-expectation of privacy analysis.309 
These courts hold that whether a defendant has proven the subjective 
prong is a purely factual question, whereas whether the objective 
prong is met is a purely legal question.310  
Even without going so far, the subjective prong is really a 
question of whether the defendant has met the burden of 
demonstrating a belief that an area would remain free from 
                                                 
304 Id. 
305 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104. 
306 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
307 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that a 
defendant’s subjective belief was objectively unreasonable because placing trash 
bags on the street exposed them to the public, i.e. the defendant relinquished 
control). 
308 See United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104–05). 
309 See, e.g., United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210–13 (1986)); United 
States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997) (making the distinction in 
the abandonment context). 
310 See, e.g., McKennon, 814 F.2d at 1543; Garzon, 119 F.3d at 1450. 
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governmental intrusion.311 As Greenwood demonstrates, a defendant 
can have a subjective belief that is objectively unreasonable.312 For the 
sake of producing coherent and useful precedent, courts should 
analyze the objective and the subjective prong separately. This avoids 
conflating situations where a belief is objectively unreasonable with 
situations where the defendant has failed to make a sufficient 
evidentiary showing to establish his or her subjective belief.313 
The Seventh Circuit used two separate bases for holding that 
Carlisle did not establish a subjective expectation of privacy, even 
though it did not identify them as such. First, on a substantive level, 
the court interpreted Carlisle’s statements at the suppression hearing as 
cutting against a subjective expectation of privacy.314 Second, on an 
evidentiary level, the court suggests that Carlisle did not meet his 
evidentiary burden by providing sufficient testimony to establish a 
subjective expectation of privacy.315 This evidentiary deficiency seems 
to contribute more heavily to the court’s determination.316 However, 
the court makes no overt distinction between these requirements317—
perhaps because the Peters test makes it practically difficult to parse 
them.  
The Peters test clouds analysis of the defendant’s evidentiary 
burden, especially in cases where he or she testifies at the suppression 
hearing.318 Carlisle stated that he did not know what was in the 
                                                 
311 See United States v. Rawlings, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980) (holding that 
defendants bear the evidentiary burden of proving a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and then holding that the defendant failed to do so because he did not 
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy). 
312 Recall that the defendant in Greenwood believed his trash bags left on the 
street would remain private. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39–40. 
313 See, e.g., Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 759. 
316 “The record lacks any evidence of [a] subjective expectation and Carlisle's 
testimony cuts against a finding of any subjective expectation of privacy in the bag 
since he disclaimed ownership or even knowledge of its contents.” See id. 
317 See id. at 750–60. 
318 See id. at 759. 
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backpack, so why should it matter (for instance) whether he had the 
right to exclude others?319 Amaral-Estrada stands for the proposition 
that a defendant cannot claim a subjective expectation of privacy in 
property that he or she has no knowledge of, without some further 
showing of an expectation against governmental intrusion.320 And if 
Carlisle had admitted at the suppression hearing, as did the defendant 
in Rawlings,321 that he did not expect the backpack to remain free 
from governmental intrusion, why should a court even consider
example) whether he took normal precautions to ensure privacy? 
Under ordinary circumstances, when a defendant testifies at a 
suppression hearing about his or her subjective expectation of privacy, 
the only question is whether the defendant has met the evidentiary 
requirements set forth in Rawlings and its progeny.
 (for 
                                                
322  
Indeed, Carlisle likely could have met his evidentiary burden of 
proving a subjective expectation of privacy at the suppression hearing, 
based on his conduct at the time of the search, by testifying that he 
expected the bag would remain free from governmental intrusion.323 
For instance, in Katz the Court recognized the defendant’s subjective 
expectation of privacy even though he did not meet those Peters 
factors also not found in Carlisle’s favor (notwithstanding the 
subjective expectation).324 The defendant in Katz did not have an 
ownership of possessory interest in the public phone booth, nor did he 
have a right to exclude others.325 While these facts may have affected 
 
319 See id. 
320 See supra Part II.C.1. 
321 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980). 
322 See, e.g., United States v. Salas, No. 92-2056, 979 F.2d 853, at *3 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
323 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
324 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (holding that the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy); Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759 (holding that 
Carlisle did not have the right to exclude others from the backpack). 
325 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (stating that a defendant is entitled to constitutional 
protections, even in an area accessible to the public). 
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the Court’s assessment of the objective prong, they did not defeat the 
defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy.326 
If all that Carlisle needed to say was that he thought the backpack 
would remain free from governmental intrusion, why not just say so? 
There are several possible explanations. First, he may not have 
believed that the backpack would remain private and he did not want 
to commit perjury.327 Second, it may have been a strategic decision on 
his part. After all, any statement he made admitting knowledge of the 
backpack’s contents could have been used to impeach him at trial.328 
However, this explanation is unlikely because his decision to enter a 
conditional guilty plea when the district court denied his motion to 
suppress effectively eschewed his right to a trial.329 It does not make 
sense for Carlisle to claim that he did not know what was in the 
backpack, and lose his ability to challenge the search, then forego his 
right to a trial where he could argue to the jury that he denied 
knowledge of the backpack’s contents all along.330 A third explanation, 
and perhaps the most plausible, is that Carlisle simply did not 
understand the legal and evidentiary requirements for proving a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.331 Regardless of what motivated 
Carlisle’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision illustrates that the Peters test convolutes the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy inquiry.  
 
 
                                                 
326 See id. at 359. 
327 See United States v. Humphreys, No. 03 CR 480, 2004 WL 609796, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004) (citing Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283(11th Cir. 
1982)) (holding that a defendant’s statement at a suppression hearing may be used 
for impeachment purposes at trial because the defendant has an obligation to testify 
truthfully at every proceeding). 
328 See id. 
329 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2010). 
330 See also id. 
331 See Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at 14–15 Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750 
(No. 10-1173), 2010 WL 1062301 at *14–15 (arguing that abandonment cases 
provide the controlling law for this case). 
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C. Alternative Uses for the Peters Test  
 
Because Carlisle provided testimony at the suppression hearing, 
the court should have evaluated whether that testimony, and other 
pertinent facts surrounding the search, met the evidentiary requirement 
for proving a subjective expectation of privacy by a preponderance of 
the evidence.332 However, the Peters test may not always be 
misplaced. Although it does not make sense to cast a necessary 
element (a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy)333 as but one 
of several “factors,”334 it may not be dispositive in all cases. In fact, 
when the defendant does not provide testimony at a suppression 
hearing, Peters just may be an appropriate measure of whether he or 
she has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.335  
Recall the Seventh Circuit’s statement that it is “almost 
impossible” for a defendant to carry his or her burden at a suppression 
hearing without providing some testimony or affidavit with respect to 
his or her subjective expectation of privacy.336 The court has also held 
that a bald assertion that a defendant expected privacy, when made in a 
memorandum or in a motion, is insufficient to establish a subjective 
expectation of privacy (without more).337 Unlike affidavits, 
memoranda and motions are not made under oath, so they cannot be 
used as a substitute for testimony.338 However, the Seventh Circuit has 
been careful not to completely preclude the possibility that a defendant 
                                                 
332 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980). 
333 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring). 
334 See United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1281 (7th Cir. 1986).  
335 See discussion on applying the Peters test where the defendant does not 
provide testimony about his or her subjective expectation Part II.A.3 supra. 
336 United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir 1995). 
337 United States v. Bryant, No. 07-CR-20043, 2008 WL 4724282, at * 5–6 
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that a defendant failed to prove a subjective 
expectation of privacy when the only testimony he personally provided was an 
assertion in his memorandum that he “believed he had an expectation of privacy”). 
338 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Juergens, 965 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(an affidavit is a substitute for live testimony). 
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could prove a subjective expectation without providing testimony.339 
In these cases, when a defendant merely asserts in a document 
submitted to a court that he or she expected privacy, that assertion may 
truly be but one of several factors to consider;340 certainly, it is 
insufficient on its own to establish a subjective expectation of 
privacy.341  
As noted above, the Peters test had only been applied a handful of 
times in the Seventh Circuit.342 Other than Carlisle and Peters itself, 
United States v. Bermudez is the only instance of a court in this 
jurisdiction using the Peters test while relying on a defendant’s 
testimony at a suppression hearing.343 Although that case name may 
not be familiar, it had a different name on appeal: Amaral-Estrada.344 
Recall that the Seventh Circuit did not use the Peters test in that 
case.345 Of course, this may just be a coincidence. Since courts within 
the Seventh Circuit seem to have a choice between applying the two-
prong Katz test or the five-factor Peters test,346 it is possible that 
courts choose the Peters test for a reason in cases where the defendant 
did not provide testimony.  
Another possible use for the Peters test is cases where the court 
has reason to believe the defendant may be lying about his or her 
subjective expectation.347 In United States v. Best, a district court 
                                                 
339 See Ruth, 65 F.3d at 605. 
340 See id. 
341 See Bryant, 2008 WL 4724282, at * 5–6. 
342 See discussion of the Peters test’s prevalence within the Seventh Circuit 
Part III.A.1 supra. 
343 See United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, 
at *17 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) 
344 Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, aff’d sub nom. United States v. Amaral-
Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007). 
345 Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827. 
346 Compare Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, at *17 (applying the Peters test), 
with Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827 (applying the Katz test in identical factual 
circumstances). 
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within the Seventh Circuit rejected a defendant’s claim that he 
expected privacy in a residence, even though he provided an affidavit 
claiming as much.348 The court gave two reasons for rejecting the 
affidavit as proof of the defendant’s subjective expectation: first, the 
defendant’s credibility was “to say the least, lacking”; and second, the 
court found the affidavit to contain “unsupported and otherwise 
contradicted assertions and conclusions.”349 Both of these reasons boil 
down to the court’s belief that the defendant was not being honest 
based on his demeanor in court350 and on other evidence contradicting 
the affidavit.351  
This holding is somewhat extraordinary, especially in light of 
Greenwood.352 But it also illustrates that a defendant’s evidentiary 
burden is real.353 In the face of contradictory evidence, or where a 
defendant’s credibility is otherwise questioned, even a direct assertion 
that he or she expected privacy may not be enough.354 In those cases, 
the other Peters factors (other than whether the defendant claimed to 
have a subjective expectation) could provide insight into whether the 
defendant actually held a subjective expectation of privacy.  
For instance, in Best, a more credible witness testified that he sold 
crack cocaine from the residence in eight hour shifts, even though he 
did not have a key, and that others entered the residence to buy 
                                                 
348 Id. 
349 The affidavit gave the defendant’s name, stated the he had keys to a 
residence at the time it was searched because he was a “renter,” and stated that he 
expected privacy in the residence in that access would be limited to those with keys. 
Id. at 909. 
350 The court noted that it had ample opportunity to observe the defendant’s 
demeanor as it presided over his criminal trial where the defendant “dabbled” in self-
representation, and several post-trial hearing during which the defendant testified. Id. 
at 911. 
351 A witness testified that he sold crack out of the residence in eight hours 
shifts, even though he didn’t have a key, and that several people without keys 
entered the residence to buy crack cocaine. Id. 
352 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
353 See Best, 255 F.Supp.2d at 911. 
354 See id. 
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drugs.355 The court also expressed doubt about the defendant’s status 
as a “renter” and questioned what this term meant in his affidavit.356 In 
this case, looking to the other four Peters factors could shed light on 
whether the defendant met his evidentiary burden of showing a 
subjective expectation of privacy.357 These external, objective facts 
could help discern whether the defendant truly believed the residence 
would be private.358 Interestingly, it is the test’s inevitable tendency to 
sweep in objective facts359 that makes it inappropriate in cases like 
Carlisle (where there was no question with respect to the defendant’s 
credibility),360 and useful in cases like Best. 
Despite these possible alternative uses, the Katz test remains the 
gold standard in evaluating both prongs of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy.361 Although this discussion of alternative uses provides 
further illustration of how the Peters test operates, many of the 
problems identified in Part B of this Section would still persist—
notably, the fact that applying a five-factor test makes it difficult to 
interpret most case law, which uses the two-prong test.362 In short, 
Carlisle illustrates that the Peters test is misplaced, especially in cases 
where the defendant provides testimony at a suppression hearing and 
where there is no question of credibility. 
 
 
                                                 
355 Id. at 911. 
356 “Defendant's affidavit raises more questions than it answers. From whom 
was [d]efendant renting? When did the rental begin? Where is the lease agreement? 
What was the monthly fee? How was it paid? What documents reflect that payments 
were actually made? Did payments stop after GRIT agents searched the property on 
December 3, 1999, or did they continue until [d]efendant was arrested on October 5, 
2000?” Id. 
357 See United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1281 (7th Cir. 1986).  
358 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (recognizing that a 
defendant can demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy through conduct). 
359 See supra Part III.B. 
360 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 750–60 (7th Cir. 2010).  
361 See Jeremy C. Smith, supra note 152, at 441. 
362 See Part III.B supra. 
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IV. WRONG TEST, RIGHT RESULT? 
 
A. Right result under existing law 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit may have confused its analysis, it 
did not reach the wrong result under existing precedent. Rawlings 
makes clear that a defendant bears the burden of proving a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.363 This becomes even more important when the 
defendant is not the owner of the property searched.364 Although 
Carlisle never stated that he did not care about the backpack, the fact 
that he denied knowledge of its contents makes this case analogous to 
Amaral-Estrada.365 Moreover, his failure to make any definite 
statement that he expected the backpack to remain free from 
governmental intrusion indicates that he failed to meet his evidentiary 
burden.366  
As the district court noted, there are no “magic words” for 
disclaiming a subjective expectation of privacy.367 In Rawlings, the 
defendant outright admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not 
expect his girlfriend’s purse would remain free from governmental 
intrusion.368 This type of admission will usually suffice to extinguish 
any subjective expectation of privacy.369  
Along the same lines, the Eleventh Circuit has announced that 
defendants who explicitly deny having any relationship to the area 
searched, other than access, cannot meet their burden of proving a 
                                                 
363 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). 
364 See id. at 104–05; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 (1980) 
(although property ownership is not controlling, it is factor to be considered in 
evaluating a reasonable expectation of privacy).  
365 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759; United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 
820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007). 
366 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827. 
367 Carlisle I, No. 1:08-CR-22, 2008 WL 5111346, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
368 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105. 
369 See id. 
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subjective expectation of privacy.370 Although this rule is not 
controlling in the Seventh Circuit, it provides a context for 
understanding the Amaral-Estrada decision.  
In Amaral-Estrada, the court discussed both the defendant’s 
testimony at the suppression hearing and the facts surrounding the 
search in holding that he lacked a subjective expectation of privacy.371 
However, with respect to the subjective prong of the analysis, it is 
really the defendant’s testimony that he “did not care about the bag” 
that defeats his claim.372 He also denied knowledge of the car when 
officers asked him about it, which has the same effect.373 These 
statements by the defendant evidence, and ultimately defeat, his 
subjective expectation of privacy. Although the court also mentioned 
that people the defendant did not know would enter and leave the car, 
possibly leaving or removing items, this goes toward whether his 
expectation was objectively reasonable.374  
Like the defendant in Amaral-Estrada, Carlisle denied knowledge 
of the backpack’s contents.375 He also failed to make any statements 
that he expected the backpack would remain free from governmental 
intrusion or that he expected privacy.376 Although Carlisle did not go 
so far as to say he “didn’t care” about the backpack,377 the fact that he 
denied knowledge of its contents makes it difficult to believe that he 
                                                 
370 See, e.g., United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 964 (11th Cir. 1991). 
371 Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007). 
372 See id.; compare Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105 (holding that a defendant did 
not have a subjective expectation of privacy in drugs he put in his girlfriend’s purse 
where the defendant testified that he did not expect the purse to remain free from 
governmental intrusion), with United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1542–43 
(11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant had a subjective expectation 
of privacy in drugs he placed in his female companion’s bag, in the absence of a 
statement disclaiming a subjective expectation of privacy). 
373 See 509 F.3d at 827; supra note 381. 
374 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827; supra Part III.B. 
375 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759 (7th Cir. 2010); Amaral-Estrada, 509 
F.3d at 827. 
376 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 750–60. 
377 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 827. 
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had a stake in them.378 Even assuming that the Seventh Circuit owed 
no deference to the district court, its decision has a sufficient basis in 
existing precedent.379 
 
B. Reconsidering Fourth Amendment standing 
 
The Carlisle decision, and what it reveals about Fourth 
Amendment standing, suggests that the law in this area is need of 
revision. On a procedural level, the rules surrounding Fourth 
Amendment standing seem stacked against defendants.380 On a policy 
level, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule appears to have 
given way to an overly-technical, and unduly property-based, privacy 
analysis.381 Instead of ensuring that government officials adhere to the 
procedural guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, the standing 
requirement places the burden on defendants to prove that they are 
worthy of such protections.382 
As a result, defendants often are presented with a catch-22. They 
must either admit to at least having knowledge of illicit goods (to 
prove a privacy interest),383 or forfeit a motion to suppress384 (that 
could prevent a trial altogether).385 The Supreme Court brushed aside 
this concern in United States v. Salvucci, where it held that a defendant 
charged with a possessory offense does not necessarily have standing 
                                                 
378 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d at 759. 
379 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 827; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
104–05 (1980); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). 
380 See e.g. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1980); United States 
v. Humphreys, No. 03 CR 480, 2004 WL 609796, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004).  
381 See Kerr, supra note 48, at 815–16. 
382 See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104–05. 
383 See Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 827. 
384 See Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 750–60 (7th Cir. 2010).  
385 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (excluded evidence can 
destroy the case against a defendant). 
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to challenge the search.386 This holds true even when possession is one 
of the essential elements of the offense that must be proven by the 
prosecution at trial.387 The Court responded to self-incrimination 
concerns by noting that the government cannot use a defendant’s 
testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive evidence of guilt at 
trial.388 However, the Salvucci Court determined that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether statements made at a suppression 
hearing could be used for impeachment purposes.389 In fact, the Court 
still has not ruled on the issue.390 
Circuit courts have held that a criminal defendant may be 
impeached by his or her testimony at a suppression hearing.391 The 
Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, but a lower court within 
this circuit has adopted the view that suppression testimony may be 
used to impeach a defendant.392 The rationale behind these decisions is 
that a defendant has an obligation to testify truthfully, both on direct 
and cross-examination.393 So long as the prior testimony is used only 
to attack a defendant’s credibility at trial, rather than to establish the 
truth of the matter asserted, its use is not improper.394  
                                                 
386 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1980), overruling Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (automatic standing for defendants charged with 
crimes of possession). 
387 See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91. 
388 See id. at 93–94 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 
(1968)). 
389 See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 93. 
390 See United States v. Humphreys, No. 03 CR 480, 2004 WL 609796, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004).  
391 United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287, 1289–91 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1982). 
392 Humphreys, 2004 WL 609796, at *1.  
393 Id. (citing Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
394 Humphreys, 2004 WL 609796, at *1 (citing Jaswal, 47 F.3d at 543).  
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In the case of co-conspirators, evidence may be suppressed with 
respect to one defendant, but used in the criminal trial of another.395 
This means that two defendants facing identical charges for identical 
crimes could receive dramatically different sentences, which 
undermines the even-handed administration of justice.396 
Perhaps even more troubling than the procedural pitfalls of Fourth 
Amendment standing are its policy implications. The totality-of-the-
circumstances approach used to evaluate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy encompasses both facts known to officers at the time of the 
search and facts that may be discovered well after the event.397 In this 
sense, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry focuses more 
heavily on protecting what courts view as legitimate constitutional 
rights, rather than constraining the behavior of police officers.398 The 
inquiry focuses on who is afforded constitutional protection, instead of 
whether police officers behaved in accordance with the Fourth 
Amendment.399 
The exclusionary rule has been criticized as allowing defendants 
to “get off on a technicality.”400 If a defendant wins a motion to 
suppress, it may be impossible for the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt without the excluded evidence.401 
Prosecutors may decide not to proceed with the trial and the defendant 
                                                 
395 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (holding that co-
defendants are not afforded any special standing to challenge unlawful searches of 
each other); see also United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1280–82 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of his co-
conspirator’s car). 
396 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 88 (2007) (“uniformity 
remains an important sentencing goal”) 
397 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980). 
398 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (recognizing that excluding 
evidence may completely preclude a prosecution). 
399 See id. at 133 (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights.”) (quoting 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973)). 
400 M. Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment by Alternatives to the 
Exclusionary Rule, 95 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1982). 
401 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137 (excluding probative evidence as a result of a 
constitutional violation could weaken or destroy the case against the defendant). 
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essentially “wins.”402 Regardless of whether one sees the procedural 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment as a “technicality,” it should be 
noted that the standing requirement is the “technicality” corollary for 
police officers. A search may have been conducted illegally, but there 
will be no legal recourse unless the defendant can first prove a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.403 Only after the defendant proves 
this expectation does the burden shift to the government to show that a 
warrantless search was not unreasonable.404 
The Supreme Court has justified this limiting of the exclusionary 
rule as a way to maintain the balance between competing interests 
inherent in the Fourth Amendment.405 The Court summarized the 
interests at stake by stating: 
 
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those 
whose rights the police have violated have been considered 
sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the defendant is weakened or 
destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not 
convinced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further 
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those 
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on 
the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.406 
 
Some would argue that the standing inquiry strikes an appropriate 
balance in this respect.407 But Carlisle suggests that the Fourth 
                                                 
402 See Wilkey supra note 405. 
403 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
404 Because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, the government must 
overcome that presumption to prove that no constitutional violation occurred. See 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
405 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137. 
406 Id. (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-175 (1969)). 
407 See id. 
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Amendment is better served encouraging more suppression of 
evidence, to eliminate any incentive for unlawful searches.408 
Moreover, Fourth Amendment standing does not fit within the 
reasoning put forth to justify other exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 
For instance, courts have allowed the use of illegally-obtained 
evidence in grand jury proceedings because in that context, where the 
evidence is already excludable from the criminal trial, the rule would 
have little deterrent effect on police officers.409 Likewise, courts have 
reasoned that allowing illegally-obtained evidence to be used for 
impeachment does not undermine the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule because the usefulness of such evidence is difficult 
to predict.410 Unlike these exceptions, applying the exclusionary rule 
on the basis of whether a defendant can prove a reasonable expectation 
of privacy creates a real possibility that illegally obtained evidence 
may be used at trial. This undercuts the deterrent value of the 
exclusionary rule by allowing the government to benefit from 
unlawful searches, without any repercussions.411 
Certainly, this Article does not advocate for the complete 
abolishment of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry. 
However, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment may be better served 
by putting a thumb on the scale (so to speak) when evaluating a 
defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy. Indeed, if the 
expectation exists as against governmental intrusion,412 would it not 
be fair to assume that everyone has a subjective expectation that polic
officers will not conduct warrantless searches of bags they are carrying 
(regardless of who they belong to)? Carlisle, and on a broader level, 
the standing inquiry itself, do subscribe to this assumption.  
e 





408 See also Carlisle II, 614 F.3d 750, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2010). 
409 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351–52 (1974). 
410 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980). 
411 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
412 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368–70 (1968). 
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Although the law of Fourth Amendment standing has come a long 
way in the last fifty years, it still needs some work. The foregoing 
analysis of case law suggests that evaluating a subjective expectation 
of privacy is really an exercise in measuring whether the defendant has 
proven that expectation through a preponderance of the evidence. 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Carlisle illustrates that 
some courts are still confused about the appropriate measure for a 
reasonable expectation of privacy—and even more so with respect to 
measuring a subjective expectation.  
In applying the five-factor Peters test, the court rolled the 
subjective and the objective prongs into a single inquiry. This 
conflated the defendant’s evidentiary burden with his substantive legal 
requirements, and convoluted the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
inquiry. The court should have used the two-prong Katz test instead. 
Nevertheless, the court arrived at a result supported by prevailing 
precedent. The issues raised by this case suggest that further 
clarification is needed with respect to measuring a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The decision also highlights some of the 
problems that persist in this area. In short, it may be time to re-
evaluate the law of Fourth Amendment standing. 
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